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Christian Damböck (ed.): Inuences on the “Aufbau”. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook,
Vol. 18. Berlin: Springer 2016.
In July 2013, Christian Damböck, the editor of the present volume, organized a confe-
rence at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, assessing the various inuences
on Carnap’s early masterpiece, the Logical Structure of the World (or, as it is usual-
ly referred to in the literature, Aufbau). The 18th volume of the Vienna Circle Institute
Yearbooks is devoted to the materials presented at the conference. (Though the volume
contains, as usual, two review essays, many reviews and the latest Vienna Circle Lec-
ture, delivered by Michael Beaney about “Susan Stebbing and the Early Reception of
Logical Empiricism in Britain”, I will focus only on the conference papers about the
Aufbau.)
The recent literature on Carnap and especially on his Aufbau proved that this early ma-
sterpiece of so-called analytic philosophy contains much more than just a simple empirico-
reductive and phenomenalist approach to the external world and the mind that structures it.
This view was typically upheld by Quine, Goodman, but even by such close associate of
logical empiricism as Ayer. Though the articles of the volume often mention this classical,
or received view of the Aufbau, they quickly bypass it – demolishing the old view is a task
that is already done by now. Henceforth the aim of the volume is to construe new readings,
or better, to reveal the original contexts of and inuences on the Aufbau. This duality is
also mirrored by the papers.
Those articles that belong to the second group examine the inuences on the Aufbau,
be them either individual authors, or movements, or problem-settings. Thomas Uebel, for
instance, dealt with the possible inuence of Otto Neurath. Though it is known that Neurath
reviewed Carnap’s book right after its publication and they had some (in Neurath’s eyes)
sharp debate about the nature of protocol-sentences, it is less discussed whether Neurath,
one of the “new colleagues” (51), had any inuence on the formation of the Aufbau. Uebel
built his case with great attention to the details of the Carnap archives and showed that
Neurath had problems with the book from two angles: he found the Aufbau’s individualistic
overtones troubling from his collectivist, social epistemologist perspective, and expected
more work on the physicalist promises of the work. Uebel argued, however, that “Neurath’s
physicalist sympathies cannot have inuenced the physicalism of the Aufbau because there
was no physicalism – fully-edged or virtual – in it” (66).
Matthias Neuber’s shorter contribution on Moritz Schlick’s inuence and role is a
strange piece. On the one hand, Neuber did not provide the item numbers of the archive
materials, but what is more important is that he discussed the actual topic under some very
general headings and he was more focused on Schlick than on Carnap.
Another individual inuence (though this time not personally but through books) is
Wilhelm Ostwald’s which was considered by Hans-Joachim Dahms. Though Ostwald did
not surface many times in the Aufbau (but see the pages 179–182 of Dahms paper), his
inuence is detectable quite well on the base of archive materials from the period between
the 1910s and 1928. Carnap organized a less known conference in August 1920 with his
friends from the German Youth Movement (the pedagogic Wilhelm Flitner, art-historian
Franz Roh, and sociologist Hans Freyer) whose main topic was the ‘system of sciences’
propagated earlier by Ostwald. Dahms analyzed and contextualized this meeting with its
inuence on the Aufbau’s general problem-formation and solutions.
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Clinton Tolley and Paul Ziche considered, respectively, not the role of individual gures
on Carnap’s early thought, but more general lines of inuences. Ziche, for example, argued
that in the case of Carnap, we should not think of ‘disjunctive’ philosophical schools and
movement, but of ideas, philosophical and scientic problems per se. If we take Carnap as
a scholar who looked for various and wholly different perspectives and methods for dealing
with a given difculty, then “this implies that we should free ourselves from feeling too
greatly surprised when seeing Carnap in peaceful and fruitful interaction with apparently
divergent movements” (79). Ziche’s example is the problem of ‘ordering’ and the notion
of ‘order’; he ably contextualized Carnap’s procedure in the Aufbau with the ideals of
Theodore Ziehen, Hans Driesch and Walter Dubislav.
The same methodological concerns are true of Tolley also, though he focused on Kant,
the neo-Kantians (especially Paul Natorp), Gottlob Frege, Edmund Husserl and Bertrand
Russell: what connects them is their continuous interest in the nature of logic. One of
Tolley’s major points is that the early Carnap (of and before the Aufbau and unlike, e. g.,
the Carnap of Meaning and Necessity from 1947) was much closer to Russell than to
Frege.
Most of the remaining articles could be subsumed under the general heading of “new
readings of the Aufbau” since all of them either criticize a particular ‘new reading’ or
themselves provide a new reading and interpretation of the Aufbau. One of the most im-
portant revolutionary approaches to Carnap’s magnum opus was the Kantian/neo-Kantian
rendering of it. Alan Richardson rightly emphasized in his contribution that the neo-Kanti-
an readings of Aufbau do not claim that Carnap was a single-minded neo-Kantian of any
sort, but that “[you] cannot understand some of the specic philosophical moves, attitudes,
or projects in Carnap’s early philosophy [. . .] if you do not take into account Carnap’s
engagement in the 1910s and 1920s with neo-Kantianism” (1). The real contribution of
Richardson is, however, that he called our attention to the German context of the external-
world program and discussed the role that the philosopher/psychologist Karl Gerhard
could have played in Carnap’s original German setting of the problem.
In his contribution, André Carus did not argue for a wholly new reading of the Aufbau (he
already did that in his own book) but tries to undermine a different and radical interpretation
of the Aufbau, namely the Husserlian. Carus used many archive materials as evidences to
show that though there were indeed many connections between Carnap and Husserl (both
philosophical and personal), Carnap’s early works could not be rendered as “Husserlian” in
character. He showed that Husserl and phenomenology was just one feature of theAufbau
and actually Carnap “effected a quite original synthesis between [Husserl and Russell] –
while rejecting both their larger philosophical projects” (138).
The nal two articles from this group are Thomas Mormann’s and Mikko Leinonen’s
papers. Mormann put forward a very interesting and unexpected theses, i. e. that “the
original core of the Aufbau project rested on a problem that had haunted German philosophy
since the end of the nineteenth century. In terms fashionable at the time, the problem was
characterized as a polarity between Leben and Geist (Life and Spirit)” (115). Mormann
considered highly diversied approaches to philosophy and to the mentioned gap between
Leben and Geist and showed that Carnap forged all of them into the Aufbau. Finally in order
to reconstruct Carnap’s unied account of the problem, Mormann took up the inuence
of Rickert and his theory of values which is represented by the fact that values as “cultural
object[s] [. . .] originally belonged to the realm of objects constituted in the Aufbau” (131).
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Actually Mormann seems to argue for a certain new reading of the Aufbau from the
perspective of the ‘cultural’ or ‘human sciences’ [Geisteswissenschaften].Though Carnap’s
work evidently mixes many more problems and approaches from logic, mathematics
and the natural sciences, Mormann’s new reading is specically motivated given that the
Carnap, during his most intensive formative years, participated in the so-called German
Youth Movement where he acquired certain sensitivity to the problems of human and social
sciences.
Though Mormann made his case quite solid, Mikko Leinonen starts from the conside-
rations of Mormann (and relies on his various papers many times) and argues also for a
Rickertian reading of Aufbau. It is not just that Leinonen’s paper contains many repetitions
but his language is a bit too strong; the author aims to “demonstrate” Rickert’s denite
inuence on Aufbau taking the “notion of demonstration in the meaning of conclusive
evidence or proof” (222, fn. 27). Though the thesis of the paper is quite similar to that of
Mormann’s, Leinonen articulates it in historically synthetic manner: “[Rickert’s] System
der Philosophie touched upon the issue of how to reconcile a conceptual system ‘con-
structing’ approach in philosophy (that was in line with an inuential Kantian academic
establishment) with life-philosophers’ (and particularly Nietzsche’s) anti-systematicism”
(222), the latter two having fundamental effects on the young Carnap.
Leinonen’s work, however, suffers from some lesser problems. Besides Rickert, he dealt
with the role and inuence of the neo-Kantian Hans Vaihinger, who in his major work, Die
Philosophie des Als Ob (1911), formulated such thoughts about ctions, chaos and ordering
that surfaced later in Carnap’s rst version of what become later the Aufbau. However,
almost exactly the same thoughts could be found in Wilhelm Ostwald’s Grundriss der
Naturphilosophie (1908), which was known for Carnap, so one could suspect here again the
inuence of either Ostwald (as argued by Dahms) or a certain general German trend (argued
by Ziche and Richardson). Leinonen based his arguments often on the concept-usage of
Carnap and devoted only minor footnotes to the actual personal connection between Carnap
and Rickert. It is known that Carnap was a student of Rickert in Freiburg and mentioned him
frequently in his diaries; so analyzing those records could have strengthen Leinonen’s case.
Finally, the author claimed that Rickert’s inuence was long-standing after all, since
Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950) could be read from the perspec-
tive of Rickert’s (227–229). On the one hand, Leinonen stated that Carnap’s “‘linguistic
frameworks’ derive from a ‘procedure’ of ‘construction’ that consists of imposing ‘new
rules’ that are meant to replace the old ones” (229) which indirectly goes back to ‘a will
to systematize’ originating from Nietzsche and worked out by Rickert. The idea that,
as humans, we just have the abilities and rights to rebuild (Aufbau) our entire (cultural,
social, political etc.) world could equally come from Carnap’s times in the German Youth
Movement, so some further reasoning is needed to conrm either option.
On the other hand, the author declared that Carnap’s article was introduced into the
“dispute between Carnap and W. V. O. Quine over the use of abstract objects in semantics”
(227). Though Quine was indeed an important gure, it is known from Carnap’s corre-
spondence that Otto Neurath and Ernest Nagel also disliked his approach to semantics
and abstract entities and Carnap worked on his neutral conception – to accept and use his
methods – for years in order to save his work-fellow relation to Neurath and Nagel.
The last two pieces about the inuences on the Aufbau was written by Thomas Ryckman
and Sébastien Gandon. Actually they are not about inuences: their heroes are Hermann
1. Korrektur/ mentis – PLA 19 / satz&sonders / 28.07.16 / Seite 247
Book Reviews – Buchbesprechungen 247
Weyl and Norbert Wiener respectively and neither of them inuenced Carnap during his
time of the Aufbau. Rather, Ryckman and Gandon discussed those parallels, texts and
contexts which show that how Carnap’s approach could have been reconciled or collated
with some similar, back then contemporary approaches. From these two articles, however,
the reader learns much more from the earlier philosophical atmosphere both in Germany
and the United States, than about Carnap.
Though the volume contains some typos, a somewhat strange bibliographical system,
and in some cases the page numbers are missing from the references, the editorial work
merits a favorable review since the collection of articles embraced a huge spectrum from
the missing parts of our understanding of Carnap’s Aufbau. Granting that, one could raise
the question what we shall do now? It is not the case that we have enough of Carnap’s
magnum opus and thus we shall move on to others?
Well, it is true that we now possess quite an extensive knowledge of it but there are still
many things to explore: for example the effect of the German Youth Movement, the role
of experimental psychology (which is mentioned frequently in Carnap’s diaries from that
time), the inuence of the neo-Kantian Broder Christiansen who was a daily discussion-
partner for Carnap about the ideal of constitution and arts. On the other hand, the Aufbau is
indeed a huge melting pot (as it could be seen from this volume too) thus it provides many
ways to reveal the philosophies and ideals of the Vienna Circle and all of the associates
from the 1920s and 1930s. And the inuence of the Aufbau is another matter. There is still
work to be done.
Ádám Tamás Tuboly
Robert C. Stalnaker: Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014.
The notion of context and its explication is a recurring theme in the philosophical work of
Robert Stalnaker. It also plays a major role in contemporary philosophical and linguistic
theorizing as is evident from the discussion of e. g. contextualism in epistemology and
the ever growing literature on context-sensitivity in linguistics. Stalnaker’s most recent
work on the topic is based on a series of lectures given in 2010 and 2011 in Paris and
Mexico, whereas chapter 5 is a version of already published material (Stalnaker 2011). His
motivation is the observation that despite the ubiquity of the notion of context foundational
questions regarding what a context is are mainly ignored. Building on and rening his
former contributions (Stalnaker 1999, 2002) he vindicates a broadly Gricean account of
context. His aim is to separate questions about the structure and functioning of a language
itself from the use of language in communication. Stalnaker maintains that if semantic
and pragmatic issues are conceptually distinguished, their interaction may be studied in
a more fruitful way. Context as a pragmatic notion is not conned to conventional rules
of language but to cooperative and rational agency in general. By calling for a clear cut
distinction, Stalnaker positions his dynamic pragmatics against many contemporary so-
called dynamic semantic theories in linguistics and philosophy of language that loosen a
distinction between semantics and pragmatics.
The book consists of an introduction, eight chapters and an appendix. Roughly, the rst
four chapters are dedicated to a vindication of the notions of context and presupposition as
pragmatic notions. Chapter 5 renes the notion of common ground to accommodate cente-
